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TAI -LOK LUI  AND BRIAN C.  H .  FONG
In the years leading to the handover on 1 July 1997, there were both pes-simists and optimists among the observers of the process of decoloni-sation and the establishment of the so-called “One Country, Two
systems” arrangement in Hong Kong. For the pessimists, their main concerns
were two. First, the socialist system in China could hardly accommodate a
free market, capitalist Hong Kong; conflict was inevitable. Second, the en-
counter between an authoritarian China and a highly liberalised Hong Kong
would also be a source of conflict and contention; personal freedom in Hong
Kong would quickly be contained. For the optimists, with China eager to
carry out market reform and Hong Kong being well placed to facilitate its
economic reform and modernisation, capitalism would continue to prosper
in the former British colony. The return of Hong Kong to China would there-
fore be no more than business as usual. Changes, if any, would be minimal.
Both the pessimists and the optimists failed to anticipate the kind of prob-
lems encountered by Hong Kong since 1997.
Post-1997 Hong Kong was characterised by emerging fractures, tensions,
and conflicts. But these fractures, tensions, and conflicts are not quite those
anticipated by either the pessimists or the optimists. In the years leading
up to the drafting of the Basic Law, one of the major concerns shared by
people coming from different social sectors was continuity in economic,
social, and political development. This partly has to do with the fact that
most people, with quite a significant proportion having either first-hand ex-
perience of authoritarian rule or parents who suffered from political cam-
paigns in the early post-revolutionary years, were afraid of the Communists.
Continuity, vividly captured by Deng Xiaoping’s promise of letting the Hong
Kong way of life remain unchanged for 50 years, was seen as the right di-
rection for future development. It was believed by many that changes could
be minimised and the status quo should be maintained. To some extent, it
was an idea of “deep freezing” Hong Kong. The key ingredients found in the
existing institutional setting of Hong Kong that had ensured its success in
achieving economic prosperity and political stability since the end of the
WWII should be “deep frozen.” The so-called Hong Kong system would be
kept intact and was written into the Basic Law, although calls for greater
democracy – perhaps not as widely shared in society at large as some would
like to think today – did prompt the Basic Law committee to include the
“ultimate goal” of universal suffrage. By 1 July 1997, the “deep frozen” Hong
Kong would undergo a process of defrosting. But it was expected that this
would do no more than put the past success recipe into practice in a slightly
changed environment. All those factors that were suggested to be the keys
of success had been preserved. Other than a change of the national flag,
life would continue as if nothing had happened.     
Apparently, the impact of decolonisation on Hong Kong’s institutional
structure was hugely under-estimated. The question of political mandate
and legitimacy turned out to be a major problem haunting Mr. Tung Chee-
hwa, Mr. Donald Tsang, and now Mr. Leung Chun-ying. The so-called exec-
utive-dominant political system also encountered all kinds of problems.
What was once praised as an efficient and effective administrative state,
the government of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) was found to
be incapable of carrying out effective governance. At the same time, the
Asian Financial Crisis exposed deep-rooted problems in Hong Kong’s econ-
omy. The property bubble was one of them and the failure to launch major
economic restructuring was another. The belief that the maintenance of
free-market capitalism after the handover would be sufficient to ensure
Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was found problematic. In short, the prob-
lems of the Hong Kong SAR are many.
Some of these problems are contradictions inherent in Hong Kong’s par-
ticular form of governance. Brian Fong’s analysis of the disconnect between
the executive and the legislature best illustrates the institutional fractures
in the existing system of the Hong Kong SAR. The idea of avoiding politics
in the design of the Basic Law and Beijing’s resistance to party politics (e.g.,
the political “neutrality” of the Chief Executive in terms of his/her non-af-
filiation to a political party) turned out to be major political problems after
the process of decolonisation. Post-colonial governance is not quite what
was once projected in the 1980s. Before long, the wishful thinking of main-
taining de-politicisation and leaving major decisions to be taken care of by
an administrative state have come to be seen as unrealistic since the de-
velopment of electoral and party politics has become an inevitable trend
in Hong Kong. Fong looks at the growing tensions and problems in the ex-
ecutive-dominant system. He suggests that, instead of looking back to the
good old years when the Governor and his executive arm rarely encountered
serious challenge from the legislature, Hong Kong needs to look for a new
political system by developing party-based government. Otherwise, the SAR
government will continue to be plagued by limited effectiveness in govern-
ing Hong Kong. 
Other problems, such as income inequality, have been around for many
years, but in the past they were seldom taken up by the government as
key policy concerns. Poverty relief has been discussed, but little has been
achieved in terms of major breakthrough in policy innovation. Kim Ming
Lee, Benny Ho-pong To, and Ka Ming Yu look at the growing social ten-
sions in the light of growing income disparity and the inadequacy of gov-
ernment policy in dealing with the situation of social polarisation.
Analysing the reasons why the social fabric has been torn apart by grow-
ing socio-economic inequality, they try to highlight why the existing wel-
fare regime will not be able to deal with its problems. One of the original
contributions of their paper lies in the application of the concept of fi-
nancialisation to the situation of Hong Kong. They raise an important
question: the move towards financialisation not only marks a shift of the
burden of risk from the government and employers to citizens and em-
ployees, it is also the kind of policy initiative that pays little attention to
inequalities of wealth. One of the distinctive features of socio-economic
changes in the past two decades is that the ownership of assets (in Hong
Kong, most notably property ownership) had a very significant impact
on an individuals’ livelihood. The gap between the haves and the have-
nots has widened. While the former can accumulate wealth through the
appreciation of their assets, the latter find it more and more difficult to
maintain a decent standard of living with their meagre wages. Lee, To,
and Yu underscore the gap in asset ownership and the impact this has on
the poor and deprived.   
Prior to the return of Hong Kong to China, few observers thought that the
problems arising from regional and national integration could outweigh its
benefits. Hong Kong was expected to be relatively insulated from the main-
land’s problems. Politically, Hong Kong was supposed to be an SAR with its
own legal system, a partially democratised polity, and a vibrant civil society.
Economically, its free-market capitalism would be sheltered from interven-
tions coming from the mainland’s socialist economic system. Socially, there
would be regulation of population flows, and Hong Kong’s lifestyle would
remain unchanged. Interactions between Hong Kong and the mainland were
likely to be limited to manufacturers from Hong Kong making use of re-
sources in the Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong retirees finding affordable
post-retirement living across the border. What happened since 2003 tells a
different story. The 1 July mass rally in 2003 was apparently one of the
causes of Mr. Tung Chee-hwa’s premature departure from office. It also fa-
cilitated the establishment of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA). The CEPA marked a new page in interactions between the SAR and
the mainland. With the rise of China as a new power in the world economy,
the flow of economic activity between the two places changed directions.
Hong Kong people feel increasingly uneasy about this changing economic
nexus between the SAR and the mainland. The emerging problems have lit-
tle to do with the incompatibilities between socialism and capitalism that
some observers might have anticipated in the 1980s. Rather, they are driven
by excess demands from the mainland, making free-market Hong Kong turn
towards tighter regulation and control (from the purchase of property to
the acquisition of milk powder) in order to save itself from being swamped
by mainlanders’ purchasing power.
The above constitute a new structural backdrop for understanding Hong
Kong people’s changing identity. Chi Kit Chan, making use of secondary sur-
vey data on local identity, probes the question of local Hong Kong people’s
ambivalence towards China as their nation and their resistance to a top-
down approach to build national identity. Indeed, the Hong Kong/mainland
relationship is quickly becoming a hot issue. The threat from Beijing has little
to do with its socialist economy. Rather, it is political in character (say, the
fear of losing political freedom) and touches on people’s everyday life (e.g.,
babies born to non-local parents and the shortage of milk powder triggered
by parallel exports). Whereas many Hong Kong people previously adopted a
flexible attitude by separating the political and the cultural aspects of their
Chinese identity, nowadays they have to reflect upon their identity in the
context of intimate encounters with mainlanders. Chan calls for the need to
contextualise such everyday encounters in our understanding of emerging
tensions and conflicts between locals and people from the mainland.
Tai-lok Lui also looks at regional and national integration but from a dif-
ferent perspective. He examines the changing opportunities for Hong Kong
residents to work on the mainland. Instead of seeing more and more young
people from Hong Kong finding employment opportunities across the bor-
der, he finds that relevant official statistics suggests otherwise. Contrary to
many people’s expectation that the further opening of the Chinese econ-
omy would automatically bring about new openings and opportunities for
Hong Kong people, the number of Hong Kong residents working on the
mainland has been declining since 2004. His findings alert us to the urgency
of re-examining the changing Hongkong/mainland economic nexus. The
assumption that Hong Kong is always on the winning side in the process of
economic integration is questionable. That the so-called “China opportu-
nity” is found empty and unrewarding may well be a source of tension and
grievance in the coming years. 
The focus of this special feature is placed on social and institutional frac-
tures in post-1997 Hong Kong. Indeed, post-colonial Hong Kong is in disar-
ray. Problems of all kinds abound. Together these articles present an
argument for deeper, and probably more sombre, reflection on Hong Kong’s
future.
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